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THE ARTIFICIALITY OF OUR LAW
OF EVIDENCE'
By Hon. Simeon E. Baldwin, L.L. D., Governor of. the State of
Conecticut.
The time of an American judge, in the trial of a case, is largely
taken up in excluding evidence which, if admitted, would strength-
en the case of the party who offers it. He excludes it generally,
not because he thinks it would have no effect on the jury, but be-
cause he thinks it would have such an effect; not because he
thinks *it ought not to be admitted in the interest of jus-
tice, but because there is a rule in the books against its introduc-
tion.
Who made our rules of evidence? Whence do we derive them?
What do they rest on?
The answer is easy. judges made them-for the most part,
English judges centuries ago, and made them because they had to
deal with juries composed of illiterate men of untrained minds,
incapable of making nice discriminations as to the weight of tes-
timony.
The English jury also, when the jury system took shape, was
under the control of the judge in all matters, to a degree never
known in this country. Down to the era of Vaughan's case, in the
seventeenth century, for a verdict in a criminal case that was
1 In writing this article free use has been made of a paper by the
author read at the annual meeting of the Missouri State Bar Association
September 22, 1911.
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deemed by the Crown, or the Judges acting for it, to be clearly
wrong, the jurors could be attainted and punished by fine or im-
prisonment. Not only were they to be kept together, in order to
force a verdict, as now, as long as the Judge might think proper,
but even down to the eighteenth century they were denied food,
light, or heat, and could be carted about after him from one assize
town to another. His directions, in all ordinary cases, controlled
their decision: the Judge was the deciding factor; simply speak-
ing through the mouth of the foreman.
Let us look candidly at some of the rules of evidence which
these English Judges invented from time to time and have been
handed down to us.
Consider, first, the doctrine of excluding hearsay.
Most nations make no such distinction as to the admissibility of
testimony.
Take the case of book entries made in the natural course of
business or employment. The world in general admits them, and
treats them practically as the best evidence, if the books appear to
have been fairly kept. We hunt around to find the man whose
hand actually wrote down the words, and often try to get him,
after "refreshing his recollection" by an examination of the page,
to testify that the entries were in fact correct.
In one English case it appeared that sales of coal at a mine were
reported by a workman to the foreman, who employed a book-
keeper to enter them. The book was offered in evidence to prove
the sales, but as the bookkeeper only put down what he was told
by the foreman, and the foreman only knew what the workman
told him, it was excluded, though workman and foreman were
both dead.
2
So, in another English case, it was shown to be the duty of a
Jewish Rabbi, on circumcising a child, to make an entry of the
fact in a book, and such an entry was produced to prove the date
of a particular circumcision. The Judges held that it was prop-
erly excluded, though the Rabbi was dead.8
Let us suppose, again, that a man of the highest standing and
character is the only witness of a murder. He writes a statement
of the facts to the prosecuting officer. An indictment is found,
but before the case comes on for trial he dies. No country not
ruled by Anglo-American law would exclude his written state-
2 Brain v. Preece, 11 M. & W. 773.
3 Davis v. Lloyd, 1 Car. & Kir. 275.
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ment. We should; and the murderer, in consequence, would
probably go free.
Professor Thayer was right when he said that the main func-
tion of our law of evidence is not to exclude irrelevant matter,
(plain logic does that, as a matter of course); but to exclude
matter which is relevant and logically probative. 4 Nowhere is
this clearer than in respect to the hearsay rule, and we are not
to forget that it did not secure an established footing, either in
England or America, until the close of the seventeenth century.
Certainly it is one that cannot be safely strained beyond its estab-
lished limits.
No declarations, for instance, ought to be excluded which ac-
company and serve to characterize or explain conduct of an am-
biguous nature, and are offered for the purpose simply of showing
that they were made, and not that what was declared was true.'
Actuated by these principles, the courts of Connecticut, in
recent years, have gone farther than those of most of our States,
in the admission both of hearsay and of remote evidence, and
leave it more to the discretion of the trial judge.
To illustrate: A real estate broker was employed to sell a lot.
The next year he was discharged, and soon afterwards the owner
sold it, himself.
The broker promptly sent in a bill for commissions on this sale,
and subsequently brought suit on it. He was allowed, in support
of his case in chief, to prove that he did send in such a bill, on
the ground that it was a natural act of one in the position which
he claimed to have occupied. If he had earned such a commis-
sion, it would have been contrary to the usual course of business
if he had not asked for payment in such a manner.0
A plumber sued for services rendered and materials used in
fitting up a bath-room. The defence was that he had agreed to
fit it up so that it would be supplied -with water ready for imme-
diate use. In rebuttal he was allowed to prove that at the date
of the contract it was impossible to put any apparatus into the
room which could supply water for such use. The Court said that
it could fairly be argued that a plumber would be unlikely to make
an agreement of that kind, which it was impossible to fulfil.7
4 Thayer, Legal Essays, 308.
5 Engel v. Conti, 78 Conn. Reports, 351, 354; Thayer, Preliminary
Treatise on Evidence, 522.
Bradley v. Gorham, 77 Conn., 213.
McNanzara v. Douglas, 78 Conn. 220.
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On a prosecution, for illicit sexual intercourse with a young
girl, in April, proof was received of" the defendant's like inter-
course with her three months later. It was deemed to go to show
the existence of relations at that time, which tended to make his
commission of the crime charged more probable. If he was under
the influence of a sexual passion in respect to the girl in July,
which led him then to take advantage of her youth in order to
gratify it, this was logically relevant to the question whether he
had before given rein to such a passion in respect to her, in the
same manner
s
It is surely the duty of courts everywhere, to-day, to see that no
rule of evidence is applied so as to exclude anything not fully
within the reason of the rule.
If, for instance, a memorandum of a transaction be made at
the time, in the natural course of things, such as the preparation
of a workmen's pay roll, on which the name of each man is
checked as he receives his pay, and years after, it becomes im-
portant to show that one of them was paid off, and what he got,
but the employer and his agents have no recollection in regard to
this, the memorandum ought to be allowed to speak for itself. It
is a "documentary witness," or becomes such when proof is
offered that it was made at the time of the transaction, in the
natural or usual course of business.'
The starting point, in disposing of an objection to proof of any
fact should always be this: "Unless excluded by some rule or
principle of law, any fact may be proved which logically tends to
aid the trier in the determination of -the issue. Evidence is ad-
mitted, not because it is shown to be competent, but because it
is not shown to be incompetent." The question, also, as to its re-
ception is always one to be answered with a view to practical
rather than theoretical considerations. Will or will it not tend to
throw light on the justice of the case on trial? This the trial
judge must determine largely as a matter of common sense. He
must be armed with a pretty wide discretion. 10
The present tendency of most American courts is in this direc-
tion.
We are familiar with the historical fact that jurors were
originally, in early England, witnesses, and the only witnesses.
8 State v. Sebastian, 81 Conn., 1.
9 Curtis v. Bradley, 65 Conn., 99.
10 Plumb v. Curtis, 66 Conn., 166.
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They were selected because they knew the facts. Centuries elapsed
before outsiders, who happened to know them, were allowed to
testify. But when this was allowed, and the jurors were gradually
turned into judges of facts proved by others, they remained, still,
ignorant and uneducated men. England had no system of public
education. That given by the church was slight. To keep the
minds of such men to the point in issue and to the real proof of
it, it was probably necessary to shut the door against much that
might have helped and also might have confused them. But those
times are long past. In this country they never existed.
Why then have not our courts done more towards readjusting
our rules of evidence to present social conditions?
Our jurors are now generally intelligent and fairly educated
men. There is less and less need to guard them from hearing evi-
dence which is objectionable because remote. They can them-
selves appreciate its remoteness and weigh it accordingly.
To some extent all courts have met this change of conditions.
The old rule, for instance, was that a corporation could speak
only through its records.
Now we even allow its head officers to testify as to its inten-
tions and future purposes, although there be nothing in its books
to support it. 1'
Bentham declared, a hundred years ago, in his work on Judicial
Evidence, that, as for England, jurisprudence might be defined as
"the art of being methodically ignorant of what everybody
knows."
It is to the credit of the English and American judges that they
have so largely, since Bentham's day, avoided this reproach to the
science which they profess, by enlarging the scope of judicial
notice. It is a master-key, in the hands of a judge, who breathes
the life of his time and generation. It unlocks many a door that
counsel have left shut, or have had no other way to open.
As human knowledge and invention extend, the bounds of
judicial notice extend also, 12 almost automatically.
But reforms have, in most instances, been due to legislation
more than to judicial decisions.
'NI. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. Offield, 78 Conn., 3.
12 State v. Main, 69 Conn., 135; Knowlton v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R.
Co., 72 Conn., 194; Arthur v. Northfield Church, 73 Conn., 731; Jones Co.
v. Davenport, 74 Conn., 418; New Haven Trust Co. v. Doherty, 74 Conn.,
472.
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The exclusion by the common law of testimony from anyone
interested in the event of the suit set up a rule too artificial to
endure permanently, and was generally repealed during the nine-
teenth century. This brought two important witnesses, the plain-
tiff and the defendant, into the trial of almost every action. But
soon it was found necessary to provide that in case of the death
of one of them, his statements, previously made, might, within
certain limits, be admissible to meet the testimony of the other.
How far should these limits go? Here came the occasion for new
artificial rules of legislation, raising in turn numerous questions of
judicial construction.13
A German lawyer, since become a German Judge, was in this
country a few years ago, attending a meeting of the American
Bar Association. Some one asked him, as he was about to return
home, whether he had remarked anything that he thought would
improve our American system of civil procedure. There were,
he said, just two things lacking to make it perfect. These wer6
to abolish trial by jury in civil cases, and to adopt the German
imperial civil code of procedure.
Let us look a moment at how that code (Zivilprocessordnung)
deals with evidence. It gives to the subject about 14o short sec-
tions, occupying 23 octavo pages. The chief rule is that the trier
is to be free to give the evidence, and any evidence, such weight
as he thinks it merits. Only in a few cases, particularly specified
is he bound by any set rules.
Among these I mention the main ones:
Faith is due to properly authenticated copies of records (Sec.
415). The court may order the document itself to be produced,
but if the party does not do this, and alleges reasons, the court
may still accept a copy, as wholly or partly correct (Sec. 435).
Material documents should be presented to the court (Sec. 42o),
and if they are in possession of the adverse party, he can be com-
pelled to produce them (Sec. 421, Civil Code, Sec. 8io). In case
of his default, they may be proved by copy, or their substance
treated as admitted (Sec. 427). judicial notice is to be taken of
things that are publicly notorious, (Sec. 291). Statutory pre-
sumptions cannot be contradicted, unless the statute so provides
(Sec. 292). Foreign laws need no proof, if known to the court.
This knowledge is not to be circumscribed by any evidence. The
13 Rowland v. Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Co., 63
Conn., 415.
IIO
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Judge can notwithstanding investigate for himself, or require the
parties to produce further proof (Sec. -293). Documents from
foreign offices are admissible when authenticated by a German
consul or minister; but may be received if the Court thinks proper,
without it (Sec. 438).
Whoever has to prove a thing, can offer any kind of evidence,
except that he cannot ordinarily force the adverse party to a dis-
closure on oath (Sec. 294). The parties cannot by agreement
hold the Judge bound by any particular piece of evidence.
Experts are selected by the Court, unless both parties agree;
and it may limit the number to one (Sec. 404).
Witnesses are not examined in the presence of each other, un-
less they contradict one another, when they can be confronted
(Sec. 394).
The French codes devote some two hundred and thirty sections
to the law of evidence. It is largely concerned with written
testimony-depositions and documents, and relates more to the
form of trial procedure than to the admissibility of proofs
offered. 4
Italy treats of evidence both in her Civil Code and her Code of
Civil Procedure. In her Civil Code it comes largely under the
head of Personal Relations (Articles 117-122, 170-178,) or of
Obligations (Articles 1312-1377). In her Code of Civil Pro-
cedure trial evidence occupies a hundred and twelve articles, all
brief (Art. 2o6-318).
A good illustration of the clear modes of statement in these
Codes is furnished by the Civil Code in the title which (Title 4,
Section 3,) deals with presumptions. They are defined as the
consequence which the law or the Judge deduces from a known
fact by advancing to an unknown fact.
A leading feature of foreign codes, in general, is the weight
given to papers, as against witnesses. The vital principle of our
Statute of Frauds appears in an Italian ordinance of 1454. In
view of this principle each side is usually put under the obliga-
tion of giving copies of any papers, on which he relies, to the
adverse party, before trial. Oral testimony comes in more by way
of supplement, and frequently takes the shape of affidavits, writ-
ten out and made known to each party, long before the trial.
14Code Civil, Art. 1315-1369; Code de Proceedure Civile, Art. 34-43;
193-336; Code de Commerce, Art. 41, 49; Code d'Instruction Crininelle,
Art. 32-39, 73-90, 153-156, 305, 316-326.
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In early Massachusetts this was the practice, the witnesses tes-
tifying, not in the presence of the Court, but of a magistrate.15
Our modern American law is, however, no doubt right in pre-
ferring oral testimony in court, and justifies itself amply by thus
giving opportunity for cross-examination-a great discoverer of
truth, in skilful hands.
The usages of nations having a different system of evidence
may sometimes be legitimately relied on as helping to constitute
a rule for us.
Thus, if a party desires to introduce a copy of a document re-
corded in a public office in a foreign country, that mode of authen-
ticating it may properly be accepted which is in conformity to the
general practice of nations; that is, which is sanctioned by Private
International Law.
"The-object of any such authentication is to afford satisfactory
evidence by the official custodian of the original of which it pur-
ports to be a copy, having due authority to make such certification.
Any evidence is sufficient for this purpose which is calculated to
give reasonable assurance of the facts in question."' 6 If then,
by Private International Law, as generally accepted, an at-
testation by a notary public verified by a certificate from a con-
sul, would be accepted as sufficient, it would be sufficient in an
American court, in the absence of a statute prescribing a differ-
ent mode of procedure.
The law of Evidence is a part of the law of Procedure. It
belongs, to use the forcible expression of Lord Justice Lush, to
tie machinery of remedial right, as distinguished from its
product. Unless the machinery works true, the product will be
ragged and unsatisfactory. The most effective machinery is apt
to be the simplest. To simplify our law of evidence is to restore
things to a natural basis of relation. Certainty in procedure, Sir
Frederick Pollock declares, in his First Book of Jurisprudence,
is almost more important than certainty in the substance of law.
Simplicity brings certainty.
Here is one of the greatest opportunities of the English or
American Judge. Let him make his mark on the law of evidence,
as his predecessors made theirs. He has as much power as they
15 Select Essays in Anglo-Anerican Legal History, 378; Documents
Relative to the Colonial History of New York, IV, 929.
IGBarber v. International Co. of Mexico, 73 Conn., 602; Cf. the Italian
Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 208.
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had, to shape rules to reason. He has also the power to em-
phasize or to attenuate the relation of a rule to an exception.
One solvent of difficulties that lies ready at hand, is that already
mentioned :-to give more and more range to the discretion-the
sound discretion, of course-of the trial judge. This is really the
redemptive factor of our law of evidence. Let us take more pains
to secure the choice for the bench of men that are capable of
exercising this prerogative wisely, and then give it its fullest
force. It will open many a door heretofore shut, or half shut.
It will shut many a door which there is no reason for leaving
open; for it is always to be remembered that because evidence
is logically admissible, it does not necessarily follow that it must
be admitted in any particular case.
7
The first American book on legal evidence was published in
Connecticut in i8Io, and the author, Chief Justice Swift, remarks
in his preface that the rules of evidence are of an artificial texture
not capable in all cases of being founded on abstract principles
of justice, and sometimes result in rejecting testimony which, in
the ordinary occurrences of life, might be relied on.
The term res gestae, which only won an established place in our
law about i8oo, had then recently been invented. The rule which
it implies has often been helpful, in avoiding the result which
Swift deprecated, but it is hedged about with unending techni-
calities.
The general public have not much patience with a trial result-
ing in a miscarriage of justice, because evidence, that seems to
those who are not lawyers material and proper, was excluded.
Public sentiment is as vital a force behind judgments as behind
laws. The community, as a whole, and after taking second, sober
thought, must be fairly well satisfied that justice has been admin-
istered, or there will be a smouldering fire of criticism that may
some day flare up into a source of serious danger to the stability
of our judicial institutions. The-popular recall of Judges would
never have been thought of, anywhere, had there not been judg-
ments rendered, which public opinion condemned.
Reversals on appeal of criminal convictions, because of some
ruling on evidence, have often offended public opinion, as a sub-
stitution of technicality for justice.
The Engish Judges, by a rule of Court under the Judicature
Act, refuse a new trial on account of the improper admission or
17 Barry v. McCollom, 81 Conn., 293, 299.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
rejection of evidence, unless in the opinion of the court to which
the application is made, some substantial wrong or miscarriage
of justice was the result.
Congress, in 19o9, on the recommendation of the American Bar
Association, passed a statute similar in effect. In several of our
states, the practice under their common law has been the same.
In civil cases, I believe it should be the rule everywhere.
In criminal cases there is more reason for adherence to form.
Matters of form have often saved an innocent man from con-
viction.
Nevertheless, here our system of procedure, when compared
with that of other countries, seems to me hardly to assure to the
community at large the protection they deserve. The whole trend
is towards favoring the accused at the expense of the State.
The presumption of innocence has been sadly overworked.
The germ of it is to be found in this passage in the Digest of Jus-
tinian :18 "But neither ought anyone to be condemned on suspicion.
The late Emperor Trajan wrote to Assiduus Severus: 'It is more
satisfactory that the crime of an evil doer go unpunished, than
that an innocent man be condemned for it.'"
No one can find any objection to make to this. But the English
Judges, in making it, about a hundred years ago, the source of a
definite legal presumption, raised the doctrine to a height which
lets many a guilty man go free, without any serious attempt to
discover the real author of the wrong.' 9
In England there has been a reaction in this respect, and under
the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, as practically administered in
court, the burden of proving his innocence often seems to rest
virtually on the accused. This is the result of allowing him to
testify in his own behalf, and if he has previously during the trial
"personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses
for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good char-
acter, or has given evidence of his good character, or the nature
or conduct of the defense is such as to involve imputations on
the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecu-
tion," permitting his cross-examination as to his character and as
to any previous conviction.
English criminal justice is surer than ours.
3sD. 48. 19. de Poenis 1. 5..
'9 Coffin v. U. S., 156 U. S. 432, 453.
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The "reasonable doubt" doctrine is, in its modern shape, an
American innovation. Unquestionably it has been often the cause
of verdicts of acquittal which have lessened public confidence in
the courts. This is particularly true since we have allowed the
accused to be a witness in his own behalf, without his having made
any preliminary statement before a magistrate with which his
testimony at the trial can be compared.
This right, acquired only during the last half century, is given
by statute, and so may be recalled or modified in any State, at
any legislative session.
Why not modify it by giving every man arrested on a charge
of crime, an opportunity, before consulting an attorney, to make
a statement to a magistrate and answer such questions as he may
put, and in case of his refusal to avail himself of it, refusing him
the right to testify in his own behalf ?
It may be said that this would often virtually compel him to
criminate himself. But it certainly does not compel him in terms,
and it is time for the courts to construe the constitutional guar-
anty in the light of twentieth century conditions rather than of
seventeenth century conditions.
20
It is only because we have been bred up under such an artificial
system of judicial procedure that we are content to tolerate it.
Lovers of Goethe will recall the brilliant scene in Faust's study,
when Mephistopheles dons a Professor's cap and gown, and
grants an interview to a student who wishes advice as to whether
he should study law for his profession. "My dear boy," he replies,
"keep clear of that. Laws and notions of right are inherited like
an inveterate disease: they slide themselves along from generation
to generation, and spread imperceptibly from place to place.
Reason becomes nonsense, and the best actions are called wrong.
Wo to thee that thou are somebody's grandson! Of the legal
notions that we are born with there is unfortunately never any
question made."
This is really the main cause why we keep on enforcing in trials
to the court the same rules of evidence which we have adopted in
trials to the jury. We have not stopped to think that in equity
causes, and wherever a jury is waived, the reasons for keeping
remote or doubtful evidence from untrained minds do not apply.
We cannot maintain, side by side, two inconsistent rules of
right; but we may two inconsistent rules of procedure, where the
* State v. Bartlett, 55 Maine, 215.
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question is one as to the limits of proof, and the triers are men
having different spheres of duty, and selected under different
standards of qualification.
In a bill for a Workingmen's Compensation Act, to apply when
the consent should be given of both employer and employee,
favorably reported this Summer, by the Judiciary Committee of
the Connecticut legislature (though not adopted,) was a provision
that any cases arising under it should be tried without a jury, and
that the Judge might, at his discretion, admit evidence not receiv-
able under the ordinary rules of evidence.
Such has been also, and very properly, the practice in some of
the States in trying appeals to courts from the action of admin-
istrative bodies.
The poet Coleridge said that in infancy the body and the spirit
are in unity, but with years the spirit pulls away from the body,
and dominates it. In the infancy of our law of evidence it was all
harmonious with itself. Its body and its spirit were in unity. But
now the spirit which once animated that body has gone. It has
gone higher. The body must be revitalized. Rules remain after
their reason has vanished. New ones, then, must take their place,
else we of the bar are untrue to the lawyers and judges of former
generations. We must act as sincerely as they did. We must be
as purposeful as they were. We can be, only by undoing some of
their work, good for their times, but not for ours.
Simeon E. Baldwin.
